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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Salvatore A. Williams, Salvatore C. Williams, and Adolph 
Williams (the "defendants") entered conditional pleas of 
guilty to offenses related to the operation of an illegal 
gambling business. On appeal, they contest the district 
court's denial of pretrial motions, including motions to 
suppress the evidence derived from electronic oral and 
video surveillance1 and evidence obtained in a search of 
Adolph Williams's home. We affirm. 
 
I. 
 
The illegal gambling operation that resulted in the 
defendants' convictions began in the 1960's. In initially 
investigating the operation, the Pennsylvania State Police 
utilized a confidential informant and conducted physical 
surveillance of an office located at 1420 Fifth Avenue, 
Pittsburgh (the "Fifth Avenue premises") that was believed 
to serve as the operation's headquarters. Concluding that 
these investigative techniques were insufficient, the District 
Attorney of Allegheny County filed applications in the 
Superior Court of Pennsylvania under the state Wiretapping 
and Electronic Surveillance Control Act, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. SS 5701-26, seeking authorization for the state police 
to conduct electronic oral and video surveillance of two 
rooms of those premises. The applications were supported 
by an affidavit of two Pennsylvania State Troopers who 
explained some of the evidence already gathered by other 
means and the basis for their belief that electronic oral and 
video surveillance were necessary. Some of the information 
contained in the affidavit was provided by the confidential 
informant who had worked within the organization for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We use the phrase "electronic oral surveillance" as shorthand for the 
interception of wire, electronic, or oral communications within the 
meaning of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
of 1968, 18 U.S.C. SS 2510-20, and the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and 
Electronic Surveillance Control Act, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. SS 5701-26. 
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seven years. The affidavit further stated that the state 
police were conducting the investigation in conjunction with 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. A. 50-124. 2 
 
On June 26, 1991, Judge Justin M. Johnson of the 
Superior Court signed an order authorizing electronic oral 
surveillance of the Fifth Avenue premises for a period of 30 
days. He denied the request for video surveillance 
authorization, believing that the state wiretapping statute 
did not empower a Superior Court judge to authorize video 
surveillance, but he provided that his orders were"entered 
without prejudice to the applicant seeking further 
additional relief in the appropriate Court of Common Pleas."3 
A. 18(d). Accordingly, the next day, the District Attorney 
filed an application for video surveillance in the Court of 
Common Pleas of Allegheny County. This application was 
supported by the same affidavit as the application for 
electronic oral surveillance previously filed in the Superior 
Court. Court of Common Pleas Judge Robert Dauer granted 
the application and authorized video surveillance of the 
same two rooms for a period of 30 days. After 30 days 
passed, the District Attorney requested and received 
extensions for both orders from the respective courts. All 
electronic oral and video surveillance of the Fifth Avenue 
premises ended on Friday, August 9, 1991. On Monday 
morning, August 12, 1991, the tapes of the surveillance 
were sealed. 
 
In May 1993, the United States Attorney for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania applied to a federal magistrate 
judge for a search warrant for the residence of Adolph 
Williams at 274 Foxcroft Road, Pittsburgh (the "Foxcroft 
Road residence"). The application was supported by an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. "A." denotes the one-volume Appendix submitted by Salvatore A. 
Williams. 
 
3. Under the state wiretapping statute, an application for authorization 
to conduct electronic audio surveillance must be made to a judge of the 
Superior Court, see 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.S 5708. Judge Johnson 
apparently concluded that his authority under the state wiretapping 
statute did not extend to video surveillance and that an application to 
conduct such surveillance should therefore be made to a judge of the 
Court of Common Pleas, the state trial-level court. 
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affidavit executed jointly by a Special Agent of the FBI and 
a Pennsylvania State Trooper who were involved in the 
investigation. The affidavit stated that physical surveillance 
had revealed that an individual associated with the 
operation took betting slips twice daily from a location on 
Fifth Avenue, Pittsburgh, to the Foxcroft Road residence. 
The affidavit related that in an intercepted comment Adolph 
Williams had said that he would take the gambling 
proceeds to his home for safekeeping, and the affidavit 
added that the confidential informant had learned that 
Adolph Williams had a hiding place in his residence that 
was used for storing records. On May 25, 1993, the 
magistrate judge issued the search warrant. The search 
was conducted on that day and resulted in the seizure of 
currency, gambling records, and other evidence. 
 
The office of the United States Attorney for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania presented the case to a federal 
grand jury, and some of the electronically intercepted 
evidence was disclosed to the grand jury, even though no 
court order specifically authorizing such disclosure had 
been obtained. Some of this same evidence was also 
disclosed to agents with the Criminal Investigation Division 
of the Internal Revenue Service. A. 317. 
 
The grand jury returned a 27-count indictment, charging 
conspiracy and various gambling and income tax offenses. 
The defendants moved to suppress much of the evidence 
intercepted through the electronic oral and video 
surveillance, as well as the evidence seized from the search 
of the Foxcroft Road residence. The district court initially 
suppressed evidence derived from the oral and video 
surveillance on the ground that it exceeded the periods 
authorized by the state court judges. The government 
appealed, and we reversed in an unpublished opinion, 
holding that the district court had misinterpreted the state 
court orders. United States v. Williams, No. 95-3529 (3d 
Cir. May 20, 1996). On remand, the defendants all entered 
conditional guilty pleas that preserved for appeal the 
district court's denial of their other pretrial motions. 
 
Salvatore A. Williams pleaded guilty to one count of 
violating 18 U.S.C. S 371 by conspiring to conduct an illegal 
gambling business in contravention of 18 U.S.C.S 1955(a). 
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He was sentenced to one month of imprisonment and two 
years of probation. Salvatore C. Williams and Adolph 
Williams pleaded guilty to conducting an illegal gambling 
business, in violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 1955 and 2, and to 
one count of violating 18 U.S.C. S 371 by conspiring to 
defraud the United States of wagering tax revenue. They 
were sentenced to 15-month terms of imprisonment and 
three-year terms of supervised release, and they were fined 
$40,000 and $4,000, respectively. The defendants then took 
this appeal. 
 
On appeal, the defendants contend (1) that the district 
court erred in refusing to suppress the video surveillance 
evidence because that surveillance was conducted in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) that the evidence 
seized from Adolph Williams's home should have been 
suppressed because the warrant was not supported by 
probable cause; (3) that the charges under 18 U.S.C.S 1955 
should have been dismissed because those charges were 
based on violations of Pennsylvania gambling statutes that 
violate the Equal Protection Clause; (4) that the district 
court erred in refusing to suppress the electronically 
intercepted oral evidence because the Pennsylvania 
wiretapping statute does not comply with the certain 
requirements of Title III of the federal Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.SS 2510- 
2520 ("Title III"); (5) that the district court erred in refusing 
to suppress the electronically intercepted oral evidence 
because it was disclosed in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. SS 5718 and 5717(a); (6) that the district court erred 
in refusing to suppress the electronically intercepted oral 
evidence because there was no necessity for the use of this 
investigative technique, as is required by 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. S 5709(3)(vii) and 18 U.S.C. S 2518(1)(c); (7) that the 
extension of the period of electronic surveillance was 
unjustified and that the evidence obtained as a result 
should have been suppressed; and (8) that the district 
court erred in refusing to suppress the electronically 
intercepted oral evidence because the tapes were not timely 
sealed as required by Title III and the state wiretapping 
statute.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The first four arguments are raised in the joint brief submitted on 
behalf of Salvatore C. Williams and Adolph Williams; citations to "Jt. 
Br." 
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II. 
 
We turn first to the defendants' argument that the video 
surveillance of the Fifth Avenue premises violated the 
Fourth Amendment and that the evidence resulting from 
this surveillance should have been suppressed. The 
defendants do not contend that either Title III or the 
Pennsylvania wiretapping statute authorizes or prohibits 
video surveillance. Instead, they base their arguments on 
the understanding of the governing legal principles set out 
in United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1984). In 
Torres, the Seventh Circuit held, among other things, that 
Title III has no application to video surveillance, id. at 880- 
82; that a federal district court has the authority, either 
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 or by virtue of 
its inherent powers, to issue a warrant for video 
surveillance, id. at 877-80; that video surveillance is a 
search governed by the Fourth Amendment, id. at 882; and 
that if the government conducts video surveillance in 
conformity with certain requirements of Title III, including 
the requirement of judicial certification that"normal 
investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or 
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be 
too dangerous," 18 U.S.C. S 2518(3)(c), then the government 
has also conformed to the related requirements contained 
in the Fourth Amendment's warrant clause, 751 F.2d at 882.5 
No party in this appeal contests any of these principles, 
and therefore we will assume their validity for present 
purposes. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
refer to that joint brief. The final four arguments are raised in the 
brief 
filed on behalf of Salvatore A. Williams; citations to "SAW Br." refer to 
his 
brief. Each brief incorporates by reference the arguments raised in the 
other. 
 
5. Other courts of appeals have taken a similar approach. See United 
States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674, 680 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Mesa- 
Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1437 (10th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. 
Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 542 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1005 
(1992); United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 252 (5th Cir. 
1987); United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504, 510 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 827 (1986). 
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A. The defendants contend that the video surveillance in 
this case was "unreasonable" within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment because the nature of the crimes under 
investigation did not justify the use of such an intrusive 
investigative technique. In making this argument, the 
defendants rely on certain statements in Torres . While 
upholding the video surveillance in that case, which 
targeted "safe houses" in which it was believed that a 
terrorist group was assembling bombs, the Torres  court 
wrote: 
 
       The usual way in which judges interpreting the Fourth 
       Amendment take account of the fact that searches vary 
       in the degree to which they invade personal privacy is 
       by requiring a higher degree of probable cause (to 
       believe that the search will yield incriminating 
       evidence), and by being more insistent that a warrant 
       be obtained if at all feasible, the more intrusive the 
       search is. But maybe in dealing with so intrusive a 
       technique as television surveillance, other methods of 
       control as well, such as banning the technique outright 
       from use in the home in connection with minor crimes, 
       will be required, in order to strike a proper balance 
       between public safety and personal privacy. That 
       question is not before us, but we mention it to make 
       clear that in declining to hold television surveillance 
       unconstitutional per se we do not suggest that the 
       Constitution must be interpreted to allow it to be used 
       as generally as less intrusive techniques can be used. 
 
751 F.2d at 882-83 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 
Relying on these remarks, the defendants maintain that 
their offenses were not sufficiently serious to justify video 
surveillance. However, the video surveillance in this case 
was not conducted in a "home," and the order authorizing 
the video surveillance was based on a finding that the 
defendants had committed, were committing, and would 
continue to commit first-degree felonies, which are 
punishable by imprisonment for up to 20 years.6 Thus, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The video surveillance authorization order referred to violations of 18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 911 (which pertains to"corrupt organizations" and 
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even the equivocal and limited Torres dicta does not 
support reversal. 
 
We note that every court of appeals that has addressed 
video surveillance has held that video surveillance 
conforming to the standards set out in Title III is 
constitutional, and we have found no case that suggests 
that the application of these standards depends upon the 
nature of the crime or crimes under investigation. Title III 
standards were applied in every case, covering a range of 
crimes from counterfeiting to drug distribution to 
loansharking. E.g., Falls, 34 F.3d 674 (conspiracy to 
distribute cocaine, distribution of cocaine, and related 
charges); Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536 (money laundering); 
Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433 (counterfeiting); Cuevas- 
Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248 (possession of marijuana with intent 
to distribute); Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504 (loansharking). For 
these reasons alone, we reject the defendants' argument 
here. 
 
Moreover, we are skeptical of the defendants' general 
suggestion that a judicial officer, in deciding whether to 
issue a search warrant or in reviewing the issuance of a 
search warrant, should take into account his or her own 
evaluation of the seriousness of the felony or felonies under 
investigation. Other than the Torres dicta, the defendants 
cite no authority that provides any support for this 
proposition. In considering the reasonableness of a search 
or seizure, it is sometimes appropriate for a court to 
balance "the public interest and the individuals's right to 
personal security free from arbitrary interference by law 
officers." United States v. Brignoni-Ponce , 422 U.S. 873, 878 
(1975); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 885 
(1997). But it does not follow that a judicial officer, in 
weighing the public interest, may properly take into 
account his or her personal opinion regarding the need for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
is a first-degree felony) and a conspiracy to commit that offense (and 
others), 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 903, which is also a first-degree 
felony. 
See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 905(a). Afirst-degree felony is punishable 
by imprisonment for not more than 20 years. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
S 1103(1). The order also referred to one misdemeanor, a violation of 18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 5512, which concerns illegal lotteries. 
 
                                9 
 
 
 
or the importance of the criminal provisions that appear to 
have been violated. Like other citizens, judicial officers 
differ in their views regarding the seriousness of certain 
criminal offenses. If judicial officers were permitted to take 
their personal opinions on these matters into account in 
deciding whether a particular search was reasonable, the 
meaning of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment 
would vary significantly depending on the particular 
judicial officer before whom the question was presented. 
 
The defendants here characterize their gambling offenses 
as relatively benign, and there are undoubtedly those who 
would agree with this characterization. But that view of 
illegal gambling is not universal. In enacting Title III, 
Congress thought that gambling offenses were sufficiently 
serious to include them among the crimes in the 
investigation of which it is permissible to employ 
wiretapping and bugging, investigative techniques that 
result in a serious invasion of personal privacy. See 18 
U.S.C. S 2516(1)(c) (permitting federal wiretapping or 
bugging to investigate illegal transmission of wagering 
information and operation of gambling enterprises); and id. 
S 2516(2) (permitting state wiretapping and bugging to 
investigate gambling offenses). Congress also has made it a 
felony, punishable by up to five years' imprisonment, to 
conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct, or own all or 
part of an illegal gambling business. 18 U.S.C.S 1955. And 
Congress has designated violations of this provision as 
predicate offenses under the money laundering statute, id. 
S 1956, and the RICO statute, id.S 1961, which carry even 
more substantial penalties. In treating gambling offenses in 
this way, Congress has plainly concluded that certain 
gambling offenses are serious crimes,7  and it is not for us 
to review the correctness of this evaluation. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In reaching this conclusion, Congress was undoubtedly influenced by 
its recognition that gambling has historically provided a major source of 
revenue for organized crime groups. See President's Commission on 
Organized Crime, The Impact: Organized Crime Today 12-13 (1986); 
President's Commission on Law Enforcement Administration of Justice, 
The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 188 (1967); cf. The National 
Gambling Impact Study Commission Act, Pub. L. 104-169, 110 Stat. 
1482 (1996) (establishing federal commission to conduct a 
comprehensive study of the social and economic impacts of gambling in 
the United States). 
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In sum, we reject the defendants' argument that the 
video surveillance in this case violated their Fourth 
Amendment rights on the ground that the offenses under 
investigation were insufficiently serious to justify the use of 
this intrusive investigative tool. 
 
B. The defendants next assert that the video 
surveillance of the Fifth Avenue premises failed to meet 
Title III's requirement that "normal investigative procedures 
have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be 
unlikely to succeed if tried or are too dangerous." See 18 
U.S.C. S 2518(3)(c). Specifically, the defendants argue that 
the application was defective because it did not state why 
electronic oral interception could not have been used before 
resorting to video surveillance. As a result, they argue that 
the video surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment as 
well. 
 
In Title III cases, courts have consistently held that 18 
U.S.C. S 2518(3)(c) does not require the government to 
exhaust all other investigative procedures before resorting 
to electronic surveillance. See United States v. Barnes, 47 
F.3d 963, 965 (8th Cir. 1995); Falls, 34 F.3d at 682; Mesa- 
Rincon, 911 F.2d at 1443; United States v. Apodaca, 820 
F.2d 348, 350 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 903 (1987); 
United States v. Webster, 734 F.2d 1048, 1055 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied sub nom., Hoskins v. United States, 469 U.S. 
1073 (1984). Rather, it is sufficient if there is evidence that 
"normal investigative techniques . . . reasonably appear to 
be unlikely to succeed if tried." 18 U.S.C. S 2518(3)(c). "The 
government need only lay a `factual predicate' sufficient to 
inform the judge why other methods of investigation are not 
sufficient." United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 345 (3d 
Cir.) (quoting United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 38 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Conti v. United States, 423 
U.S. 858 (1975)); cert. denied sub nom., Hauser v. United 
States, 506 U.S. 956 (1992). Furthermore, in determining 
whether this requirement has been satisfied, a court "may 
properly take into account affirmations which are founded 
in part upon the experience of specially trained agents." 
United States v. Ashley, 876 F.2d 1069, 1072 (1st Cir. 
1989); see also United States v. Landmesser, 553 F.2d 17, 
20 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 855 (1977). "The 
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government's showing is to be `tested in a practical and 
commonsense fashion.' " McGlory, 968 F.2d at 345 (quoting 
United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d 838, 849 (3d Cir. 1976)).8 
 Since the defendants contend that the Fourth 
Amendment should be held to require compliance with 18 
U.S.C. S 2518(3)(c) in video surveillance cases, we see no 
reason why the rules developed in cases in which that 
provision is directly applicable should not be applied here 
as well, and it appears that other courts of appeals in video 
surveillance cases have taken on this approach. Our review 
of those cases shows that the inadequacy of other 
investigative techniques has been proven by demonstrating 
such factors as the inability of a confidential informant to 
gather additional information, the futility of electronic oral 
surveillance where the crime was being committed in 
silence, the use of evasive tactics by the investigation's 
targets, and the difficulty of penetrating an organization 
with a secretive nature and a propensity towards violence. 
 
For example, in Falls, the affidavit stated that a 
government informant who had been successful in getting 
information in the past would no longer be helpful because 
she was not privy to the drug distribution group's sources, 
the extent of the operation, or its method of distributing the 
proceeds. 34 F.3d at 677. The affidavit further stated that 
her access to the group's meeting place was limited by 
safety concerns. Id. The affidavit named and discussed a 
total of seven investigative techniques that had been tried 
or appeared too dangerous or unlikely to succeed in light of 
the drug conspiracy's secretive nature and propensity 
towards violence. Id. at 683. These affirmations were held 
to be sufficient to demonstrate the inadequacy of other 
investigative techniques. Id. 
 
In Mesa-Rincon, the government submitted an affidavit 
asserting that audio surveillance was not feasible because 
the crime, counterfeiting, could be committed without oral 
communication and because the noise of the printing 
presses drowned out any conversation. 911 F.2d at 1444. 
The affidavit also stated that interrogation and infiltration 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Our standard of appellate review is plenary. United States v. McGlory, 
968 F.2d at 345. 
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of the operation were not viable alternatives, because either 
technique would have aroused suspicion and prevented the 
successful completion of the investigation. Id.  In addition, 
the affidavit asserted that a traditional search would 
likewise have been unfruitful, because it was "quite likely 
that the key evidence of actual counterfeit bills might not 
be found." Id. at 1445. Under these circumstances, the 
court held that the government had satisfactorily 
demonstrated that other investigative techniques were 
inadequate. See also Biasucci, 786 F.2d at 511 (affidavit 
sufficient because it showed that some confidential sources 
refused to testify, the undercover agent was not permitted 
to be present at alleged loansharking transaction and at 
meetings at the defendants' business premises, interviews 
with victims were not feasible, search warrants and grand 
juries were not expected to produce significant evidence, 
and prior victims would be unlikely to testify for fear of 
reprisals); Torres, 751 F.2d at 877 (affidavit sufficient 
because it showed that FBI had reason to believe that the 
people involved in the bomb construction operation, fearing 
that they might be bugged, played the radio loudly when 
they were speaking to one another, spoke in code, and built 
the bombs in silence). 
 
In the instant case, the affidavit stated that execution of 
a search warrant was unlikely to succeed because it would 
reveal the facts of the investigation to the targets. A. 55. 
The affidavit noted that the probable cause affidavit would 
have to be attached to the warrant when it was executed 
and that this would cause the targets to take defensive 
measures, which would impede the progress of the 
investigation. A. 55. The affidavit also stated that since 
organizations such as the one involved in this case are 
highly suspicious of unfamiliar persons, the use of another 
confidential informant would not have been fruitful. A. 56. 
The affidavit stated that the confidential informant who had 
been used previously, as well as physical surveillance and 
the gathering of law enforcement intelligence information, 
had been utilized to the fullest extent possible and that any 
further use of such techniques might result in discovery. A. 
59. The affidavit noted that the organization transacted its 
business in private and via cellular phones, making it 
difficult to investigate the organization and learn the 
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identities of upper echelon figures. A. 57-60. The affidavit 
noted that the informant had said that some type of 
electronic detection equipment might have been installed to 
alert the targets to surveillance attempts. A. 58. Finally, the 
affidavit stated: 
 
       Video surveillance is being requested in order to 
       further assist in identifying those subjects involved in 
       this alleged criminal activity. As enumerated within 
       this affidavit, there have been occasions where 
       numerous persons have been observed within the 
       building at one time. Video surveillance will enable 
       investigators to identify those subjects intercepted, 
       rather than attempting identification through less exact 
       means such as voice exemplars. In addition, video 
       surveillance will disclose any non-verbal criminal 
       activity, such as any actual "settle up" of monies 
       between those subjects monitored in this investigation. 
 
A. 62. We believe that the affidavit provided a sufficient 
"factual predicate" for a finding that "normal investigative 
techniques" (i.e., techniques other than video surveillance) 
were unlikely to succeed. We also conclude that the 
affidavit, read in a "practical and commonsense fashion," 
sufficiently showed the need for video surveillance. There 
was probable cause to believe that what was occurring at 
the premises was the actual operation of an illegal gambling 
business, not simply conversations about or in furtherance 
of that business. Thus, as was the case in Mesa-Rincon, 
audio surveillance alone was not likely to disclose the 
identities of all of the participants and what they were 
doing. While it would not be advisable to use the 
application as a model in future video surveillance cases, 
we hold that it satisfies constitutional requirements under 
the circumstances here. We therefore affirm the district 
court's denial of defendants' suppression motion on this 
ground. 
 
III. 
 
The defendants argue that the search of the Foxcroft 
Road residence belonging to Adolph Williams violated the 
Fourth Amendment because the information used to 
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establish probable cause was stale and remote. The 
defendants contend that very little of the information 
contained in the supporting affidavit demonstrated a nexus 
between the gambling operation and the Foxcroft Road 
residence, and they argue that any information suggesting 
such a connection was obtained from a confidential 
informant who ceased working for the principals in the 
mid-1980's. Thus, the defendants contend, the information 
was stale. 
 
Probable cause is determined by a "totality-of-the- 
circumstances analysis," under which a magistrate judge 
must "make a practical, commonsense decision whether, 
given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before 
him . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). In reviewing 
such a determination, our role is quite limited. We must 
simply decide whether the magistrate judge had a 
substantial basis for concluding that probable cause 
existed. United States v. Conley, 4 F.3d 1200, 1205 (3d Cir. 
1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1177 (1994). Therefore, "a 
reviewing court is to uphold the warrant as long as there is 
a substantial basis for a fair probability that evidence will 
be found." Id. (footnote omitted). 
 
The supporting affidavit to a search warrant application 
must be read in its entirety and in a common sense and 
nontechnical manner. Id. at 1206. The affidavit need not 
contain direct evidence that proof of wrongdoing would be 
present at the premises. Id. at 1207. "Instead, probable 
cause can be, and often is, inferred by `considering the type 
of crime, the nature of the items sought, the suspect's 
opportunity for concealment and normal inferences about 
where a criminal might hide [the] property.' " Id. (quoting 
United States v. Jones, 994 F.2d 1051, 1056 (3d Cir. 
1993)). The focus should be on what the affidavit includes, 
rather than on what it does not include. Id. at 1208. 
 
The age of the information supporting a warrant 
application is a factor that must be considered in 
determining probable cause. United States v. Harvey, 2 
F.3d 1318, 1322 (3d Cir. 1993). If information is too old, it 
may have little value in showing that contraband or 
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evidence is still likely to be found in the place for which the 
warrant is sought. Id. Age alone, however, does not 
determine staleness. "The likelihood that the evidence 
sought is still at the place to be searched depends on a 
number of variables, such as the nature of the crime, of the 
criminal, of the thing to be seized, and of the place to be 
searched." United States v. Tehfe, 722 F.2d 1114, 1119 (3d 
Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom., Sanchez v. United States, 
466 U.S. 904 (1984). "[W]hen an activity is of a protracted 
and continuous nature, `the passage of time becomes less 
significant.' " Id. (quoting United States v. Harris, 482 F.2d 
1115, 1119 (3d Cir. 1973)). Thus, when the criminal 
activity has been going on continuously for years, staleness 
is of less concern. Id. at 1120 (staleness did not negate 
probable cause in drug trafficking conspiracy that had been 
going on for several years). 
 
In this case, the gambling operation began in the 1960's 
and continued through the 1990's. In light of its long and 
continuous operation, staleness is less important in the 
probable cause analysis. See Tehfe, 722 F.2d at 1120. The 
affidavit submitted in support of the warrant application 
contained information, obtained from the confidential 
informant and from physical surveillance, that suggested 
that gambling evidence would be found at the Foxcroft 
Road residence. The affidavit also related various 
electronically intercepted statements made at the Fifth 
Avenue premises that indicated that evidence would likely 
be found at the Foxcroft Road residence. 
 
The confidential informant, who had worked with the 
defendants for several years until the mid-1980's, reported 
that he knew of secret hiding places in the residence. Jt. 
App. 499.9 He also reported that Adolph Williams had once 
told him about a hidden room in the basement of the house 
that was used to conceal records. Jt. App. 499. The 
informant stated that he knew through conversations with 
other individuals involved in gambling that Adolph Williams 
was still running the operation. Jt. App. 499. Electronic 
surveillance conducted in July 1991 revealed that Salvatore 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. "Jt. App." refers to the appendix submitted on behalf of Salvatore C. 
Williams and Adolph Williams. 
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C. Williams expressed concern about leaving money at the 
Fifth Avenue premises, and Adolph Williams stated that he 
would take the money home with him. Jt. App. 494. 
Physical surveillance conducted between December 1992 
and April 1993 revealed that an individual took a pouch 
believed to contain numbers slips on a twice-daily basis 
from a gym located on Fifth Avenue to another location and 
then to the Foxcroft Road residence, where he would stay 
for up to one hour. Jt. App. 501-05. Thus, the surveillance, 
which ended in April 1993, indicated that the suspected 
criminal activity continued until at least a few weeks before 
the search was conducted on May 25, 1993. The fact that 
evidence of the suspected criminal activity continued up 
through the last weeks before the search strongly suggests 
that the information in the affidavit was not stale. 
 
In light of the protracted nature of this criminal 
enterprise, we conclude that the magistrate judge had a 
substantial basis for concluding that there was probable 
cause to believe that records, numbers slips, or large 
amounts of money would be found at the Foxcroft Road 
residence. As the government points out, "[t]he primary 
evidence sought was records, which are generally created 
for the very purpose of preservation." Govt. Br. at 45. The 
informant's information regarding a secret room in the 
basement also provided support for a probable cause 
finding, since it is likely that the use of such a permanent 
and specialized feature would continue for a lengthy period. 
Furthermore, the daily movement of an individual with a 
bag from a Fifth Avenue location to the Foxcroft Road 
residence strongly suggested that the contents of that bag, 
believed to be gambling receipts, might be found at the 
residence. For these reasons, we see no basis for 
overturning the magistrate judge's probable cause 
determination. 
 
Moreover, even if we held that probable cause was 
lacking, suppression of the evidence obtained pursuant to 
the warrant would not be justified under United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Although the defendants 
maintain that the affidavit in this case was "so lacking in 
indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its 
existence entirely unreasonable," id. at 923 (citation 
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omitted), that argument is patently wrong. We therefore 
affirm the district court's denial of defendants' motion to 
suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the search of 
the Foxcroft Road residence. 
 
IV. 
 
The defendants argue that the district court should have 
dismissed counts one and two of the indictment on equal 
protection grounds. These counts charged that the 
defendants conspired to and did in fact violate 18 U.S.C. 
S 1955 by conducting a gambling business in violation 
of a Pennsylvania statute, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.S 5514, 
that prohibits "pool selling," "bookmaking," and related 
activities. The defendants contend that this Pennsylvania 
statute violates the Equal Protection Clause because it 
prohibits some forms of gambling while other state laws 
authorize other forms of gambling such as the state lottery. 
Taken together, the defendants maintain, these laws create 
a disparity of treatment between "entities which engage in 
state-authorized gambling" and "entities which engage in 
gambling not authorized by the state." Jt. Br. at 36. The 
defendants contend that 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.S 5514 is 
subject to strict scrutiny because it "impinges upon the 
exercise of certain fundamental rights," namely,"the right 
to hold specific private employment," "the right to enter 
contracts," and "the right of association for economic and 
social reasons." Id. at 36. The defendants argue that the 
only interest ever served by 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.S 5514 
was "preventing the inflammation of the gambling instinct," 
that the Commonwealth no longer views this as an 
important interest and indeed now has an interest in 
"encouraging the gambling instinct" (id.  at 29), and that 
therefore 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 5514 cannot survive any 
degree of equal protection scrutiny. 
 Before addressing the merits of defendants' equal 
protection argument, we must determine the standard that 
governs our analysis. "[A]s a general matter, economic and 
social legislation is subject to rational basis review, under 
which a law need only be rationally related to a legitimate 
state interest." Tolchin v. Supreme Court of New Jersey, 111 
F.3d 1099, 1113 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotations 
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omitted). However, suspect classifications, such as those 
based on race, national origin, or alienage, and 
"classifications affecting fundamental rights are given the 
most exacting scrutiny." Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 
(1988) (citation omitted). Such laws must be "suitably 
tailored to serve a compelling state interest." City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); 
see also Artway v. Attorney General of New Jersey , 81 F.3d 
1235, 1267 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
For equal protection purposes, "fundamental rights" 
include such constitutional rights as the right of interstate 
travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), the right 
to vote, Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972), rights 
guaranteed by the First Amendment, Williams v. Rhodes, 
393 U.S. 23 (1968), and the right to procreate, Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). See Massachusetts Bd. of 
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 n.3 (1976) (per 
curiam). However, the rights asserted by the defendants 
here do not qualify for strict scrutiny. 
 
As noted, the defendants claim that 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. S 5514 affects their "right to hold specific private 
employment." However, it is settled that laws restricting 
access to specific types of private employment are subject 
to only rational basis review. See, e.g., Leis v. Flynt, 439 
U.S. 438, 444 n.5 (1979) (practice law); Schware v. Board 
of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (same); Williamson 
v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (fitting 
or duplicating eyeglass lenses); Kotch v. Board of River Port 
Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947) (pilotage of vessels); see 
also Edelstein v. Wilentz, 812 F.2d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 1987) 
("The Constitution does not create fundamental interests in 
particular types of employment."). Thus, we cannot subject 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 5514 to strict scrutiny on this 
basis. 
 
Nor is strict scrutiny justified on the ground that this 
provision affects the defendants' right to enter into 
contracts (whether wagering contracts or other contracts 
related to the operation of a gambling business) or on the 
ground that it affects their "right of association for 
economic and social reasons." Jt. Br. at 29. All laws 
restricting access to particular types of private employment 
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have these effects. For example, in Williamson , a state 
statute permitted only licensed optometrists and 
opthamologists to fit or duplicate eyeglass lenses. Not only 
did this law affect the ability of persons not within the 
favored groups to obtain this particular type of private 
employment, but it also affected their ability to enter into a 
variety of contracts, such as contracts of employment to fit 
or duplicate lenses and contracts with customers for the 
fitting or duplication of lenses. Likewise, the law challenged 
in Williamson affected the ability of persons not in the 
favored groups to associate with others for the purpose of 
fitting or duplicating lenses. Yet the Supreme Court 
subjected the law at issue in Williamson to only rational 
basis review. See 348 U.S. at 489. We are therefore 
persuaded that this same standard of review applies here. 
 
Under this standard, "a law need only be rationally 
related to a legitimate state interest," Tolchin, 111 F.3d at 
1113 (internal quotation omitted), and 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. S 5514 easily satisfies this requirement. In prohibiting 
certain gambling activities but not others, Pennsylvania 
lawmakers could have rationally concluded that the 
prohibited activities are particularly undesirable-- because 
they have an increased tendency to encourage self- 
destructive behavior, because they are especially 
susceptible to the dishonest practices and organized crime 
connections that have historically plagued the gambling 
business, or for other reasons. As the Court wrote in 
Williamson: 
 
       Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions 
       and proportions, requiring different remedies. Or so the 
       legislature may think. Or the reform may take one step 
       at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem 
       which seems most acute to the legislative mind. The 
       legislature may select one phase of one field and apply 
       a remedy there, neglecting the others. 
 
348 U.S. at 489 (citations omitted); see also Commonwealth 
v. Hainsey, 550 A.2d 207, 209 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) 
(rejecting argument that enforcement of 18 Pa. Con. Stat. 
Ann. S 5514, prohibiting pool selling and bookmaking, is 
unjust because the Commonwealth promotes the state 
lottery and condones wagering at rack tracks; S 5514 was 
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"enacted as a legitimate exercise of legislative authority."). 
We conclude that S 5514 is rationally related to a legitimate 
state interest, and we therefore reject the defendants' equal 
protection challenge. 
 
V. 
 
The defendants next argue that the oral evidence 
electronically intercepted from the Fifth Avenue premises 
should have been suppressed because the Pennsylvania 
statute under which the authorization was obtained does 
not comply with 18 U.S.C. S 2518. The defendants contend 
that the state statute is deficient in that it permits a law 
enforcement officer to swear out the supporting affidavit 
used to establish that there is probable cause for the 
interception and that other investigative procedures are 
inadequate. The defendants maintain that the federal 
statute requires "the attorney for the government" to make 
such assertions. SAW Br. at 12. This distinction is critical, 
the defendants contend, because approval and oversight by 
government attorneys provides an `administrative check' to 
avoid arbitrary invasions of privacy rights by government 
officials." Id. at 13. 
 
The defendants' argument is based on a misreading of 
the relevant provisions of Title III. When an order 
permitting electronic interception of wire or oral 
communications is sought in federal court, the application 
must be authorized by certain high-ranking Justice 
Department officials, 18 U.S.C. S 2516(1), but the 
application need not be made by a government attorney. 
Section 2518(1) provides in pertinent part: 
 
       Each application for an order authorizing or approving 
       the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic 
       communication under this chapter shall be made in 
       writing upon oath or affirmation to a judge of 
       competent jurisdiction and shall state the applicant's 
       authority to make such application. Each application 
       shall include the following information: 
 
       (a) the identity of the investigative or law enforcement 
       officer making the application, and the officer 
       authorizing the application; 
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       (b) a full and complete statement of the facts and 
       circumstances relied upon by the applicant, to justify 
       his belief that an order should be issued, including (i) 
       details as to the particular offense that has been, is 
       being, or is about to be committed, (ii) . . . a particular 
       description of the nature and location of the facilities 
       from which or the place where the communication is to 
       be intercepted, (iii) a particular description of the type 
       of communications sought to be intercepted, (iv) the 
       identity of the person, if known, committing the offense 
       and whose communications are to be intercepted; 
 
       (c) a full and complete statement as to whether or not 
       other investigative procedures have been tried and 
       failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to 
       succeed if tried or to be too dangerous . . . 
 
18 U.S.C. S 2518 (emphasis added). 
 
As is evident from the highlighted language, S 2518 does 
not require that an application be made by an attorney; 
instead, such an application may be made by an 
"investigative or law enforcement officer." Nor does S 2518 
require a statement by a government attorney regarding the 
attorney's belief that an interception order should be 
issued; instead, the statute requires a statement regarding 
the applicant's belief that such an order should be issued, 
as well as "a full and complete statement" (by someone, 
presumably including the applicant) as to the inadequacy of 
other investigative techniques. Thus, there is no textual 
requirement that an attorney for the government make 
these statements, as the defendants contend. 
 
The defendants cite no case law supporting the 
proposition that a law enforcement officer's affidavit is 
insufficient in a case in which federal court approval for 
wiretapping or bugging is sought, and we have found no 
such case. To the contrary, affidavits sworn out by law 
enforcement officers have been held to be sufficient. See, 
e.g., United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 144 n.1 (1974) 
(affidavit of FBI special agent); United States v. Falls, 34 
F.3d 674, 676 (8th Cir. 1994) (affidavit of FBI special 
agent); United States v. Ashley, 876 F.2d 1069, 1071 (1st 
Cir. 1989) (affidavit of DEA special agent). 
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The Pennsylvania statute pursuant to which the 
application in this case was made provides: 
 
       Each application for an order of authorization to 
       intercept a wire or oral communication shall be made 
       in writing upon the personal oath or affirmation of the 
       Attorney General or a district attorney of the county 
       wherein the interception is to be made and shall 
       contain all of the following: 
 
       (1) A statement of the authority of the applicant to 
       make such application. 
 
       (2) A statement of the identity and qualifications of 
       the investigative or law enforcement officers or agency 
       for whom the authority to intercept a wire or oral 
       communication is sought. 
 
       (3) A sworn statement by the investigative or law 
       enforcement officer who has knowledge of relevant 
       information justifying the application, which shall 
       include: 
 
        (i) The identity of the particular person, if known, 
       committing the offense and whose communications are 
       to be intercepted. 
 
        (ii) The details as to the particular offense that has 
       been, is being, or is about to be committed. 
 
       . . . 
 
        (iv) A showing that there is probable cause to 
       believe that such communication will be committed on 
       the wire communication facility involved or at the 
       particular place where the oral communication is to be 
       intercepted. 
 
       . . . 
 
        (vii) A particular statement of facts showing that 
       other normal investigative procedures with respect to 
       the offense have been tried and have failed, or 
       reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or 
       are too dangerous to employ. 
 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 5709 (emphasis added). Thus, 
under the Pennsylvania scheme, the application must be 
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made by the Attorney General or a district attorney and 
must be supported by an affidavit of a law enforcement 
officer. 
 
As we have noted, when a federal court order is sought, 
18 U.S.C. S 2518(1) does not require that a government 
attorney execute the affidavit used to establish probable 
cause and the inadequacy of other investigative techniques, 
and we are not persuaded that Title III demands anything 
more when an application is made to a state court. Under 
18 U.S.C. S 2516(2), such an application must be made by 
a state's "principal prosecuting attorney" or by "the 
principal prosecuting attorney of any political subdivision 
thereof," and the judge may grant the application"in 
conformity with" S 2518. We do not interpret this provision 
to require that an attorney make the statement supporting 
probable cause or the inadequacy of other investigative 
techniques. See United States v. Smith, 31 F.3d 1294, 1298 
(4th Cir. 1994) (affidavit of police officer), cert. denied, 115 
S. Ct. 1170 (1995); United States v. Homick, 964 F.2d 899, 
903 (9th Cir. 1990) (affidavit of detective); United States v. 
Young, 822 F.2d 1234, 1237 (2d Cir. 1987) (affidavit of 
state police detective). 
 
Furthermore, it is apparent that when the Attorney 
General of Pennsylvania or a district attorney submits an 
application to a state court and relies on an affidavit of a 
law enforcement officer, the Attorney General or district 
attorney, as an officer of the court, is implicitly representing 
that it is his or her belief that there is probable cause for 
the surveillance and that other investigative techniques are 
inadequate. To be sure, the Attorney General or district 
attorney makes that implicit representation in reliance on 
the law enforcement officer's affidavit, but the same type of 
reliance would almost certainly occur even if the Attorney 
General or district attorney were to execute the affidavit. 
Statements made by an affiant submitted in support of a 
warrant may be based on information provided by others, 
see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, and it is unrealistic 
to expect that a state attorney general or district attorney 
will routinely acquire sufficient firsthand information about 
the grounds for a warrant application so as to be able to 
base his or her affidavit on anything other than information 
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relayed by field investigators and their supervisors. Thus, 
we do not agree with the defendants that the Pennsylvania 
scheme eliminates an important "administrative check." 
 
VI. 
 
The defendants contend that electronically intercepted 
evidence from the Fifth Avenue premises was disclosed to a 
federal grand jury in violation of provisions of the 
Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance 
Control Act, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. SS 5717(a) and 5718, 
and that therefore this evidence should have been  
suppressed.10 As we understand the defendants' argument, 
it runs as follows. The order signed by the Superior Court 
judge authorized the interception of conversations relating 
to certain state offenses, viz., "offenses involving Corrupt 
Organizations, 18 Pa. C.S. S 911; Lotteries, 18 Pa. C.S. 
S 5512; and/or Conspiracy to commit the aforesaid 
violations in violation of 18 Pa. C.S[.] S 903." Jt. App. 80. 
Under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 5718, when an authorized 
interception of wire or oral communications intercepts 
"communications relating to offenses other than those 
specified in the order of authorization," these 
communications and evidence derived from them may be 
disclosed before a federal grand jury only if an application 
to a court is made and the court makes certain findings "in 
advance of such disclosure." Here, the government 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The defendants also contend that evidence was improperly disclosed 
to agents of the Internal Revenue Service's Criminal Investigation 
Division, but the defendants do not explain the basis for this argument. 
Under 18 U.S.C. S 2517(1), the Pennsylvania State Troopers authorized 
by court order to intercept oral communications were permitted to 
disclose the contents "to another investigative or law enforcement officer 
to the extent that such disclosure is appropriate to the proper 
performance of the official duties of the officer making or receiving the 
disclosure." See United States v. Iannelli , 477 F.2d 999, 1001 (3d Cir. 
1973) ("These Internal Revenue Service agents are investigative or law 
enforcement officers within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. S 2510(7) and 
disclosure was appropriate to the performance of their duties."), aff 'd, 
420 U.S. 770 (1975). Therefore, based on the brief treatment given to the 
issue of disclosure of evidence to IRS agents in the defendants' briefs, 
we 
see no ground for holding that this disclosure was improper. 
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acknowledged that portions of the intercepted 
communications were presented to a federal grand jury 
without a prior authorization order. See Govt. Br. at 18-19. 
Based on these facts, the defendants argue that this 
disclosure violated 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 5718, that 
suppression was required under Commonwealth v. Hashem, 
584 A.2d 1378 (Pa. 1991), and that this state rule of 
suppression is applicable in this federal case because "a 
Title III type interception conducted under State law and 
proposed to be used in a federal court must meet any state 
standards which are `more demanding than federal ones' in 
the district in which the offer is made." SAW Br. at 14-15 
(quoting United States v. Geller, 560 F. Supp. 1309, 1312 
(E.D. Pa. 1983), aff 'd, 745 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1985) (table)). 
 
It appears that the defendants are arguing that Title III 
requires suppression when communications are intercepted 
pursuant to a state statute and are subsequently disclosed 
in violation of state law. However, it is also possible that the 
defendants are arguing that the suppression remedy 
provided by state law is directly applicable under these 
circumstances in a federal case. We will therefore address 
both arguments. 
 
A. In considering the question of suppression under 
federal law, two statutory provisions must be taken into 
account. The first, 18 U.S.C. S 2515, states: 
 
       Whenever any wire or oral communication has been 
       intercepted, no part of the contents of such 
       communication and no evidence derived therefrom may 
       be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other 
       proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, 
       department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative 
       committee, or other authority of the United States, a 
       State, or a political subdivision thereof if the disclosure 
       of that information would be in violation of this chapter. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). The second, 18 U.S.C.S 2518 (10)(a) 
provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
 
       Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or 
       proceeding in or before any court, department, officer, 
       agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the 
       United States, a State, or a political subdivision 
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       thereof, may move to suppress the contents of any wire 
       or oral communication intercepted pursuant to this 
       chapter, or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds 
       that -- 
 
        (i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted; 
 
        (ii) the order of authorization or approval under 
       which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or 
 
        (iii) the interception was not made in conformity with 
       the order of authorization or approval. 
 
The Supreme Court has explained the relationship 
between these two provisions. In United States v. Giordano, 
416 U.S. 505, 524 (1974), the Court wrote that "[w]hat 
disclosures are forbidden [under S 2515], and are subject to 
motions to suppress, is . . . governed by S 2518(10)(a)." 
Thus, evidence may be suppressed only if one of the 
grounds set out in S 2518(10)(a) is met. Moreover, " `[not] 
every failure to comply fully with any requirement provided 
in Title III would render the interception of wire or oral 
communications "unlawful" ' " underS 2518(10)(a)(i). United 
States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 433 (1977) (quoting 
United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 574-75 (1974)). 
Rather, suppression is mandated "only for a `failure to 
satisfy any of those statutory requirements that directly 
and substantially implement the congressional intention to 
limit the use of intercept procedures to those situations 
clearly calling for the employment of this extraordinary 
investigative device.' " Donovan, 429 U.S. at 433-34 (quoting 
Giordano, 416 U.S. at 527). 
 
Construing these statutory provisions, our court held 
more than 20 years ago that Title III does not prescribe 
suppression as a remedy for a disclosure violation. United 
States v. Iannelli, 477 F.2d 999, 1001 (3d Cir. 1973), aff 'd, 
420 U.S. 770 (1975). We wrote that "the suppression 
remedy specified in 18 U.S.C. S 2518(10) applies to 
unlawful interceptions. A civil remedy applies to unlawful 
disclosures. 18 U.S.C. S 2520." Id.; see also United States v. 
Vento, 533 F.2d 838, 855 (3d Cir. 1976). Other courts of 
appeals have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., United 
States v. Barnes, 47 F.3d 963, 965 (8th Cir. 1995); Resha 
v. United States, 767 F.2d 285, 288 (6th Cir. 1985) ("we 
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construe S 2518 to permit suppression of evidence only if 
that evidence was derived from unlawful, improper or 
unauthorized interceptions of wire or oral communications. 
It does not authorize suppression for disclosures of such 
information, even if they violate S 2517.") (emphasis in 
original), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1081 (1986).11 
 
Iannelli and Vento are binding on us here, and in any 
event we see no basis for questioning their reasoning. The 
section of Title III governing suppression, 18 U.S.C. 
S 2518(10), sets out three grounds for suppression, and 
none of these grounds applies to evidence that is 
intercepted lawfully but that is later disclosed improperly. 
For improper disclosure, Title III instead authorizes a civil 
remedy. See 18 U.S.C. S 2520(a).12 
 
If the defendants based their argument on an alleged 
violation of federal nondisclosure requirements, the 
authorities cited above would be directly controlling, but 
the defendants have attempted to weave their way around 
these obstacles by contending that suppression is required 
because a state nondisclosure provision was violated and 
because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in Hashem 
that evidence disclosed in violation of that provision must 
be suppressed. The defendants point out that under 18 
U.S.C. S 2516(2), an authorization order signed by a state 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. We are not persuaded by the defendants' reliance on United States v. 
Marion, 535 F.2d 697, 703-04 (2d Cir. 1976), and United States v. 
Brodson, 528 F.2d 214 (7th Cir. 1975). Insofar as these cases 
suppressed evidence based on violations of the nondisclosure restrictions 
in 18 U.S.C. S 2517(5), these decisions are contrary to controlling 
precedents of our court. 
 
12. This provision provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
 
       Except as provided in section 2511(2)(a)(ii), any person whose 
wire, 
       oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or 
       intentionally used in violation of this chapter may in a civil 
action 
       recover from the person or entity which engaged in that violation 
       such relief as may be appropriate. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 2520(a) (emphasis added). The exception set out in 18 U.S.C. 
S 2511(2)(a)(ii) applies to "providers of wire or electronic communication 
service" and certain persons associated with them. It thus has no 
application here. 
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judge must be "in conformity with [18 U.S.C.S] 2518 . . . 
and with the applicable State statute," and the defendants 
rely on cases holding that suppression is required in federal 
court when state officers intercept communications in 
violation of the applicable state statute. See United States v. 
Butz, 982 F.2d 1378, 1383 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 
891 (1993); United States v. Vario, 943 F.2d 236, 244 (2d 
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1036 (1992); United States 
v. Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub 
nom., Hobson v. United States, 472 U.S. 1017 (1985); 
United States v. Brown, 872 F.2d 385, 388-90 (11th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 898 (1989). 
 
We are not persuaded by the defendants' attempts to 
circumvent Iannelli and Vento. We understand these 
precedents to rest on the proposition that 18 U.S.C. 
S 2518(10)(a) sets out the exclusive grounds for suppression 
under Title III but omits any reference to disclosure 
violations. Since this provision makes no mention of federal 
or state disclosure violations, we see no basis for holding 
that this provision authorizes suppression for state, but not 
federal, disclosure violations. 
 
Whether the Pennsylvania courts would have ordered 
suppression under Hashem makes no difference. We will 
discuss below the question whether the Pennsylvania 
suppression rule is directly applicable in this federal case. 
At present, we are addressing the question whether federal 
law requires suppression, and the defendants have not 
called to our attention any provision of Title III that requires 
or authorizes the suppression of evidence in federal court 
simply because a state court would have ordered 
suppression as a remedy for a violation of the state 
disclosure provision. Nor are we aware of any such federal 
statutory provision. Without such a provision, we see no 
basis for holding that federal law requires suppression here 
simply because the Pennsylvania courts might have 
required suppression in a state prosecution. Accordingly, 
we hold that federal law does not require suppression of the 
evidence that, according to the defendants, was unlawfully 
disclosed. 
 
B. We therefore turn to the question whether 
Pennsylvania law of its own force requires suppression in 
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this case. It clearly does not. "It is a general rule that 
federal district courts will decide evidence questions in 
federal criminal cases on the basis of federal, rather than 
state, law." United States v. Rickus, 737 F.2d 360, 363 (3d 
Cir. 1984); see also, e.g., United States v. Stiver, 9 F.3d 298 
(3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1136 (1994); United 
States v. Shaffer, 520 F.2d 1369, 1372 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied sub nom., Vespe v. United States, 423 U.S. 1051 
(1976); United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 49, 52 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858 (1975). Moreover, the relevant 
state statutory provision, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.S 5721(a), 
does not purport to govern federal cases. It provides that a 
motion to suppress may be made "in any trial, hearing, or 
other adversary proceeding in or before any court or other 
authority of this Commonwealth." 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
S 5721(a) (emphasis added). 
 
For these reasons, assuming for the sake of argument 
that evidence was disclosed in violation of state law, we 
hold that the district court did not err in refusing to 
suppress that evidence.13 
 
VII. 
 
The defendants next argue that the electronically 
intercepted oral evidence from the Fifth Avenue premises 
should have been suppressed because the affidavit did not 
indicate that normal investigative procedures would be 
inadequate, as required by 18 U.S.C. S 2518(3)(c). The 
defendants maintain that the confidential informant could 
have been further utilized in lieu of electronic surveillance. 
As we have stated, the affidavit submitted with the oral 
surveillance application was the same as that submitted 
with the video surveillance application, the sufficiency of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The government makes two additional arguments in support of its 
position on this issue. It argues that the disclosed communications were 
relevant to the state offenses listed in the interception order and that 
the 
state judge implicitly authorized disclosure to federal authorities by 
granting an extension of the interception order and granting an order 
authorizing postponement of service of inventory. Because we conclude 
that suppression is not an available remedy for unlawful disclosure, we 
do not reach these arguments. 
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which has already been discussed. See supra Part II(B). 
Accordingly, we will not address this argument again at this 
point. We note only that the informant had ceased working 
for the organization approximately six years before the 
affidavit was prepared, and therefore the probability of his 
continued effectiveness as an informant was low. 
 
VIII. 
 
Defendants additionally challenge the affidavit in support 
of the extension of the oral interception order for the Fifth 
Avenue premises, arguing that there was no basis to 
conclude that continuing the interception would produce 
any additional information. Extensions require the same 
showing as an initial application. 18 U.S.C. S 2518(5). 
Thus, the same determinations as to probable cause and 
the inadequacy of other investigative procedures must be 
made. Id. S 2518(3). 
 
The affidavit submitted in support of the extension 
request stated that continued interception was needed 
because successful interception of conversations had been 
limited due to background radio noise. A. 131. The affidavit 
also stated that it was believed that the defendants were 
playing the radio for the purpose of thwarting the attempt 
by police to listen to conversations. Id. However, the 
affidavit added that those conversations that were audible 
indicated that defendants were involved in an illegal 
gambling operation. Id. The affidavit further stated that one 
of the participants in the operation, Louis Esposito, whose 
telephones had previously been wiretapped, was 
approached by police in an attempt to gain his cooperation 
in investigating defendants. A. 140. Shortly after the 
interview, the affidavit revealed, Esposito informed Adolph 
Williams of the interview and told him that the police were 
investigating the operation. Finally, the affidavit stated that 
the police had attempted further physical surveillance of 
the Fifth Avenue premises but that surveillance teams had 
reported that many of the targets were using evasive 
tactics, such as circling the block, switching lanes, and 
running red lights after waiting for the green light to turn 
red, in order to prevent anyone from following them 
through the intersection. A. 145. The affidavit indicated 
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that investigators were in the process of determining 
whether a mobile tracking device would assist in the 
surveillance of key targets and that the investigators were 
also exploring the feasibility of aerial surveillance. A. 145- 
46.14 Based on these representations, we believe the 
government made an adequate showing of probable cause 
and lack of alternative investigative means to justify the 
extension of the surveillance order. We therefore hold that 
the district court's denial of defendants' motion to suppress 
evidence obtained during the extension was proper. 
 
IX. 
 
Finally, the defendants argue that the electronically 
intercepted oral evidence from the Fifth Avenue premises 
should have been suppressed because the tapes were not 
sealed in accordance with federal and state law. The 
interception ended on Friday, August 9, 1991, but the 
tapes were not sealed until Monday, August 12, 1991. The 
district court found that the tapes were sealed as soon as 
practical after the intervening weekend and denied the 
motion to suppress. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. The affidavit states: 
 
       Your affiants believe that while there has been progress throughout 
       the course of this interception, that a further period of 
interception 
       will be required to identify the relationships and responsibilities 
of 
       the parties already identified and to identify other participants 
in 
       this organization. As previously stated, this investigation is 
unusual 
       in that many of the subordinate parties had not been previously 
       identified as to identity and also as to activity. Due to the short 
and 
       abrupt nature of the majority of the conversations intercepted to 
       date, further interceptions are necessary to be able to establish 
       beyond a reasonable doubt, the sources of the cash which is flowing 
       through this building. Because of the nature of the conversations, 
       much of the evidence will be of a circumstantial nature. This is 
       especially true because of the documented efforts of these 
       individuals to avoid detection by: evasive tactics, including their 
       driving patterns; playing of loud music within the area of 
       interception, and shredding of physical evidence such as those 
       papers believed to contain documentation as to the amount of 
       money which flows through this organization. 
 
A. 148-49. 
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Federal and Pennsylvania law require the sealing of 
recordings "[i]mmediately" upon the expiration of the 
surveillance order or any extensions of such order. See 18 
U.S.C. S 2518(8)(a); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.S 5714(b). 
Section 2518(8)(a) contains "an explicit exclusionary 
remedy for noncompliance with the sealing requirement." 
United States v. Ojeda Rios, 495 U.S. 257, 263 (1990). If 
the tapes are not immediately sealed upon expiration of the 
order, the government must not only explain why a delay 
occurred but must also explain why the delay was 
excusable. Id. at 264-65. The term "[i]mmediately" means 
that the tapes should be sealed either as soon as practical 
after the surveillance ends or as soon as practical after the 
final extension order expires. United States v. Vastola, 915 
F.2d 865, 875 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1120 
(1991). If the tapes were sealed as soon as practical, our 
inquiry ends, and the order denying the motion to suppress 
must be affirmed. United States v. Carson, 969 F.2d 1480, 
1491 (3d Cir. 1992). If the tapes were not sealed promptly 
enough, we must ask whether the government provided an 
objectively reasonable explanation for the delay. Id. 
 
In Carson, 969 F.2d at 1488, we held that the sealing of 
certain recordings was immediate within the meaning of the 
statute where the surveillance was completed at the end of 
one week and tapes were sealed at the beginning of the 
next week. One order expired on Wednesday, May 12, 1982, 
and the tapes were sealed on Monday, May 17, 1982. We 
held that "[w]hen the intervening weekend is considered, 
there is no indication in the record that the tapes were not 
sealed as soon as was practical," and we therefore held that 
those tapes were sealed "immediately." Id.  at 1498. A 
second order expired on Thursday, December 16, 1982, 
and the tapes were sealed on Wednesday, December 22, 
1982. We held that since the gap included an intervening 
weekend, those tapes were also sealed "immediately." We 
accordingly did not reach the issue of whether the 
government's delay was excusable with respect to either 
order. 
 Here, the government learned that the issuing judge, for 
whom a progress report had been prepared for the purpose 
of sealing the tapes, was out of town and would be 
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unavailable to seal the tapes on Friday, August 9, 1991, the 
day the extension would expire. Therefore, on Wednesday, 
August 7, a request was made for a substitute judge to be 
appointed, and Judge Kate Ford Elliot was assigned to the 
case. On Thursday, August 8, the assistant district attorney 
spoke with Judge Elliot and requested to seal the tapes on 
Saturday, August 10. Judge Elliot told him that Monday, 
August 12 would be adequate to seal the tapes, and on 
Monday, August 12, the tapes were sealed. 
 
We conclude that the tapes were sealed "immediately" for 
the purpose of the statutory sealing requirement. Under the 
holding of Carson, where the surveillance ends on Friday 
and the tapes are sealed on the following Monday, the 
sealing is immediate in light of the intervening weekend. 
Furthermore, even if the Monday sealing were not deemed 
to be immediate, the assistant district attorney's reliance on 
the judge's decision to wait until Monday was certainly 
reasonable, and consequently the delay was excusable. The 
assistant district attorney had previously arranged for a 
substitute judge in order to comply with S 2518(8)(a) and 
had deferred to that judge's decision to seal the tapes the 
following Monday. We believe it would be unreasonable to 
expect the attorney to seek out a third judge to seal the 
tapes after Judge Elliot had told him that waiting until 
Monday would be sufficient. 
 
X. 
 
For the reasons explained above, we affirm the judgments 
against the defendants. 
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